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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
PIaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JERRY N. WELLS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 880492-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from the Second Circuit Court, State of 
Utah, County of Weber, Ogden department and jurisdiction is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 78-2a-3(2)(c), 1953, as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL 
1. Was there probable cause to stop appellant's vehicle and 
charge him with driving under the influence of alcohol. 
2. Was there sufficient evidence introduced at trial to support 
a conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol. 
FACTS 
On August 15, 1988, appellant was driving a motor home east 
on 21st Street in Ogden, Utah approaching a semiphore at Wall 
Avenue. Utah Highway Patrolman David Ball was stopped at the 
21st and Wall Avenue intersection. As appellant turned north on 
Wall, Trooper Ball's attention was drawn to the right rear door 
of appellant's vehicle which was swinging open. The appellant 
proceeded north on Wall Avenue making a left hand turn onto 20th 
Street. Trooper Ball proceeded westbound on Wall Avenue well 
behind appellant's vehicle. As appellant turned onto 20th 
Street, Trooper Ball noticed the vehicle door again swing open 
as well as an improper turn. The Trooper proceeded to stop 
appellant to inform him of the possible safety hazard created by 
an open door. When stopped, appellant got out of his vehicle 
and proceeded toward the Trooper's patrol car. Trooper Ball 
immediately noticed appellant's impaired walk, slurred speech, 
glassy eyes and odor of alcohol. The appellant admitted to 
consuming four or five beers prior to the stop. Trooper Ball 
requested appellant to perform field sobriety tests, which he 
failed miserably. The appellant was placed under arrest and 
transported to the Weber County Jail and requested to submit to 
an intoxilyzer test. The appellant attempted to manipulate the 
intoxilyzer by not giving a complete sample and later refused 
altogether. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The actions of Trooper Ball in stopping appellant's vehicle 
can be sustained on two distinct basis. First, appellant 
committed two separate traffic violations in the Trooper's 
presence, e.g. improper turn and driving a motor vehicle with an 
open door and secondly, even without the traffic violations a 
highway patrolman has an obligation to stop motorists and warn 
them of possible hazards then existing with the motor vehicle. 
Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a police officer has an 
obligation to investigate possible crimes such as driving under 
the influence. 
The appellants arrest was properly based upon probable cause 
indicating an impaired condition due to alcohol consumption 
which inhibited safe operation of a motor vehicle. 
Sufficient evidence was introduced at trial from a variety 
of sources, including appellant which sustains a finding of 
guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STOP OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS BASED UPON A 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION. 
The fourth amendment provides all people with the right to 
be secure in their persons against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. Constitutional Amendment IV. The protections of 
the fourth amendment extend to individuals driving a motor 
vehicle and require that police intrusions be based upon a 
"reasonable articuable suspicion" of criminal activity. 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 649, 653 (1970). 
The "reasonable articuable suspicion" standard for stopping 
a motor vehicle is universally accepted and has been 
specifically adopted by this court. State v. Tru-jillo, 739 P.2d 
85 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . To justify the stopping of a motor 
vehicle a police officer must be able to "point to specific, 
articuable facts which, together with the rational inferences 
^rawn from those facts would lead a reasonable person to 
conclude [the suspect] had committed or was about to commit a 
crime". Trujillo at 88. A police officer does not need 
"probable cause" to stop a motor vehicle. 
Applying sections 41-6-108.10 and 41-6-66, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to trooper Balls' observations of 
appellant's vehicle provides a sufficient basis for the initial 
stop: 
41-6-108.10. Vehicle Door-Prohibited Opening. No 
person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on a side 
available to moving traffic unless and until it is safe 
to do so and can be done without interfering with the 
movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave 
the door open on a side of a vehicle available to moving 
traffic for a period of time longer than necessary to 
load or unload passengers. (Emphasis added.) 
41-6-66. Turning-Manner-Traffic Control Devices. 
(applicable part) 
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as follows: 
2) Left turns: The operator of a motor vehicle 
intending to turn left shall approach the turn from the 
extreme left hand lane for traffic moving in the same 
direction. Whenever practical, the left turn shall be 
made by turning onto the roadway being entered in the 
extreme left hand lane for the traffic moving in the 
same direction, unless otherwise directed or by an 
official traffic control devise. (Emphasis added) 
41-6-12. Violation of Chapter-Class B Misdemeanor, 
unless specified. A violation of any provision of this 
chapter is a class B misdemeanor, unless otherwise 
provided. 
The appellant's vehicle was first observed at the intersection 
of Wall Avenue and 21st Street with the right rear passenger 
door swinging open (Transcript p. 9). Trooper Ball observed the 
open door again at 20th Street, as well as appellants improper 
turn from Wall Avenue (Transcript p. 9) . Trooper Ball had no 
less than two separate traffic violations committed in his 
presence (improper turn and open vehicle door), providing ample 
basis for the stop of appellant's vehicle. The initial stop of 
appellant's vehicle was based upon a reasonable articuable 
suspicion. 
POINT II 
A POLICE STOP OF A MOTOR VEHICLE TO INFORM THE DRIVER 
OF A POSSIBLE SAFETY HAZARD IS NOT UNREASONABLE 
Even if Trooper Ball had not observed a traffic violation, 
his stop of appellant's vehicle was reasonable in light of the 
potential safety hazards. Trooper Ball's stop of appellant's 
motor home to inform him of the open door is not an unreasonable 
seizure protected by the fourth amendment. The protections of 
the fourth amendment serve to "prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by law enforcement officials". State v. Trujillof 
739 P.2d 85 (Ut Ct. App 1987) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980)). Such was clearly not the case 
at bar. 
A police stop of a motor vehicle, even for a benign purpose, 
must be made in harmony with the fourth amendment proscriptions 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979). Whether a particular vehicle stop is 
unreasonable "depends on a balance between the public interest 
and an individual's right to personal security free from 
arbitrary interference by law officers. United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
The reasonableness of a non-criminal, non-investigatory stop 
depends upon a balancing of the competing interests involved in 
light of all surrounding facts and circumstances. South Dakota 
v. Opper many 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The appellant's right to 
continue driving undisturbed by police must be balanced against 
the public's interest in having Trooper Ball perform basic 
public safety functions. The public safety police function is 
sometimes characterised as "community caretaking functions". 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 441 (1973). At least two appellate 
courts in the Pacific Reporter region have confronted this 
issue. State v. Chisholm , 696 P.2d 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) 
held that police may temporarily stop a vehicle to warn 
occupants that an item of their property is endangered)• 
Russell v. Municipality of Anchoragey 706 P.2d 687 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1985) likewise held that a a stop of a vehicle to warn the 
driver of a potential safety hazard was not unreasonable) . both 
of the aforementioned courts validated the police actions and 
further ruled that once the vehicles were stopped the police 
should investigate possible crimes as they would in any other 
situation. 
The statutory description of a highway patrolman's duties 
also supports the stopping of vehicles in certain non-criminal, 
non-investigatory situations. Section 27-10-4, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended provides in applicable part: 
27-10-4. Duties of Utah Highway Patrol. 
1) The Utah Highway Patrol shall 
a) enforce the state laws and rules governing use 
of the state highways; 
b) regulate traffic on all highways and roads of 
the state; 
A highway patrol's duty to "regulate traffic on all highways 
and roads" requires them to notify a motorist of possible 
hazards such as open doors. The failure to secure an open door 
poses potential traffic hazards to the driver and passengers of 
that vehicle and to other vehicles on the road. Trooper Ball 
acted appropriately in stopping appellant's vehicle to inform 
him of the potential hazard then existing. Once appellant's 
vehicle was lawfully stopped, the Trooper is not required to 
close his eyes to evidence of a crime. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS ARREST WAS BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE 
The statutory power and authority for a police officer to 
arrest someone is provided by Section 77-7-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, which states (applicable part): 
77-7-2. By Peace Officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a 
warrant or may without warrant arrest a person: 
1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the 
presence of any peace officer; 
A legitimate arrest requires that the police base their 
arrest upon "probable cause". United States v. Brinegar, 33 8 
U.S. 160 (1949), State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1986). The 
appellant's argument improperly lumps together the basis for the 
vehicle stop and the evidence supporting the subsequent arrest 
for driving under the influence. 
The appellant was stopped by Trooper Ball due to his 
vehicle's open door. However, once stopped the Trooper noticed 
appellant's "demeanor, his gait, the appearance of his face". 
(Transcript p. 12). These observations prompted Trooper Ball to 
inquire, "Have you had anything to drink?", to which the 
appellant replied in the affirmative, (Transcript p. 12) . The 
appellant's other physical characteristics indicating 
intoxication included: glassy eyes and slurred, repetitive 
speech. (Transcript p. 13). Based upon appellant's physical 
characteristics and his admission to drinking, Trooper Ball then 
administered a battery of field sobriety tests, including the 
walk and turn, the one leg stand, and horizontal gaze 
nystagmus. The appellant's ability to follow simple 
instructions and perform basic coordination tests was severly 
impaired. (Transcript p. 21). Trooper Ball's observations of 
appellant's actions, demeanor, and inability to perform basic 
coordination skills necessary for safe driving, coupled with an 
admission of drinking formed sufficient probable cause to arrest 
appellant for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
xhe fact that Trooper Ball did not initially have probable 
cause to believe appellant was intoxicated does not bar him from 
developing a basis for arrest once the appellant was legally 
stopped. To bar a police officer from investigating an 
obviously impaired driver who has been lawfully stopped is 
absurd and ignores one of the main reasons for employing the 
highway patrol: safety on the highway. 
POINT IV 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL TO 
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
The appellant advances the position that Trooper Ball's 
failure to perceive a driving pattern indicating intoxication 
precludes the trial court from entering a finding of guilt. 
This argument ignores the great weight of the evidence, the 
facts surrounding the initial stop, and Utah case law. 
This court recently considered two cases where there was no 
driving pattern indicating intoxication prior to the stop. 
Lay ton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Police 
summoned to convenience store on report of intoxicated driver); 
and Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah App. Ct. 1987) 
(police officer pulled in behind defendant's vehicle just after 
it stopped) . Both convictions were affirmed. There are also 
many "actual physical control" cases which result in convictions 
without the benefit of a driving pattern. A driving pattern, or 
the lack thereof, is only one factor that a trial court uses in 
determining guilt or innocense. The lack of a driving pattern 
indicating intoxication does not bar a conviction for driving 
under the influence. 
The appellant misconstrues Trooper Ball's testimony 
regarding the presence of a driving pattern indicating 
intoxication. Trooper Ball never really had an opportunity to 
observe appellant's driving. (Transcript p. 31) Trooper Ball 
was stopped at the light at 21st Street and Wall Avenue facing 
north. The appellant was eastbound on 21st Street turning north 
in front of Trooper Ball (Transcript pp. 9, 31). The Trooper's 
attention was directed at the open door in the rear of 
appellant's vehicle. (Transcript pp. 9, 31) The appellant 
traveled north for approximately one block before turning 
westbound on 20th Street. Trooper Ball again observed 
appellant1 s door swing open at 20th Street and stopped him to 
inform him of the open door. The Trooper's attention was 
directed to the open door on the vehicle, not the driving 
pattern. 
Once stopped, the indicia of appellant's intoxication are 
overwhelming. The appellant reeked of alcohol, admitted to 
drinking four or five beers, had bloodshot eyes, and miserably 
failed every field sobriety test he attempted. (Transcript pp. 
9-30). The appellant also traveled a considerable distance with 
his vehicle's door swinging open and was not even aware of it. 
The appellant would also have this court ignore the 
testimony of the other State witnesses regarding his state of 
intoxication. (Transcript pp. 47-48, 51-53, 60-65). Appellant's 
brief ignores his attempts to manipulate the intoxilyzer, his 
reasons for refusing to give a breath sample and his failure to 
consult a physician and preserve a blood sample. He would also 
have this court ignore the absurd story he gave on direct 
examination, the obvious inconsistencies exposed by cross 
examination, and his past history for being truthful 
(Transcript pp. 89-96). 
The evidence introduced against appellant supports a finding 
of guilt. The totality of circumstances, including a fourteen 
year police veteran's ultimate opinion, indicates that the 
appellant's state of intoxication was clearly beyond a "level 
which renders a person incapable of safely operating a motor 
vehicle". 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED UNLESS IT IS "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" 
The Utah Supreme Court recently changed the standard of 
appellate review in bench tried cases to "clearly erroneous". 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) . See also State v. 
Wright and Riding, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
The Court in Walker explained the meaning of clearly 
erroneous: 
The appellate court...does not consider and weigh 
the evidence de novo. The mere fact that on the same 
evidence the appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify it in setting the 
findings aside. It may regard a finding as clearly 
erroneous only if the finding is without adequate 
evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of 
the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d at 1^ 2. (Utah 1987) . 
The application of the new appellate review standard does 
not eliminate the traditional deference afforded the fact finder 
to determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Wright and 
Riding, 744 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) . See also State 
v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) (Appellate court's 
function is not to determine credibility of conflicting evidence 
or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom). 
Appellant's brief fails to direct this court to anything 
which indicates that the trial outcome is "clearly erroneous". 
The appellant instead asks the court to substitute its judgment 
for the trial court without the benefit of hearing the evidence, 
viewing the witnesses, and judging their credibility. The 
appellant is not entitled to a de novo review and has failed to 
meet his burden of showing the trial court's decision as being 
clearly erroneous. The appellant's conviction was properly 
entered and should not be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts of this case and applicable law, 
respondent respectfully requests that this appeal be dismissed 
and appellant's stay of sentence be lifted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jB day of November, 1988. 
GARY^R/)HEWARD , 
Attotrt^y for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
the day of November, 1988. 
ADDENDUM 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-66 
ARTICLE 8 
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING 
OR TURNING 
41-6-66. Turning — Manner — Traffic-control devices. 
The operator of a vehicle shall make turns as follows: 
(1) Right turns: both a right turn and an approach for a right turn shall 
be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the road-
way. 
(2) Left turns: the operator of a vehicle intending to turn left shall 
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane for traffic moving in 
the same direction. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made by 
turning onto the roadway being entered in the extreme left-hand lane for 
traffic moving in the new direction, unless otherwise directed by an offi-
cial traffic-control device. 
(3) Two-way left turn lanes: where a special lane for making left turns 
by operators proceeding in opposite directions has been indicated by offi-
cial traffic-control devices: 
(a) a left turn may not be made from any other lane; and 
(b) a vehicle may not be driven in the lane except when preparing 
for or making a left turn from or into the roadway or when preparing 
for or making a U-turn when permitted by law. 
(4) The Department of Transportation and local authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be 
placed and require and direct that a different course from that specified in 
this section be traveled by turning vehicles. The operator of a vehicle may 
not turn a vehicle other than as directed by those devices. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943, former Subsection (4) as present Subsection (3) 
57-7-130; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, and inserted at the beginning "Two-way left 
§ 22; 1978, ch. 33, § 17; 1987, ch. 138, § 65. turn lanes," redesignated the former Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- tion (3) as the present Subsection (4), and made 
ment substituted "operator" for "driver"
 m i n o r changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section, in Subsection (2) re- throughout the section, 
wrote the second sentence, redesignated the 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Contributory negligence. contributory negligence was question for jury 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas Moving 
position on the highway without signaling was & Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1971). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 3d Automo- A.L.R. — Automobiles: liability for U-turn 
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 256 to 259. collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 849. 
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 367. Key Numbers. — Automobiles *= 171(12). 
455 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-108.10 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.6, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 113, § 4. 
41-6-107.8. Motorcycle or motor-driven cycle — Protective 
headgear — Closed cab excepted — Specifica-
tions and standards. 
(a) No person under the age of 18 shall operate or ride upon a motorcycle or 
motor-driven cycle upon a public highway unless such person is wearing pro-
tective headgear which complies with standards established by the commis-
sioner of public safety. 
(b) This section shall not apply to persons riding within a closed cab. 
(c) The commissioner of public safety is authorized to promulgate and en-
force specifications and standards for the use of protective headgear required 
herein. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-107.8, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 113, § 5; L. 1977, ch. 267, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. plicable only to highways where speeds exceed 
This section is a valid exercise of police 35 MPH does not render it invalid. State v. 
power; standards as to type of headgear to be Acker, 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038 (1971). 
worn are sufficiently specific; fact that it is ap-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity of traffic regulations re- helmet or other safety equipment as contribu-
quiring motorcyclists to wear protective head- tory negligence, assumption of risk, or failure 
gear, 32 A.L.R.3d 1270. to avoid consequences of accident, 40 A.L.R.3d 
Failure of motorcyclist to wear protective 856. 
41-6-108. Prohibition as to passenger riding on improper 
portion of motor vehicle — Exceptions. 
No person shall ride, and no person driving a motor vehicle shall knowingly 
permit any person to ride, upon any portion of any vehicle not designed or 
intended for the use of passengers. This provision shall not apply to any 
vehicle driven elsewhere than upon a highway or to an employee engaged in 
the necessary discharge of his duty or to persons riding within or upon any 
motor vehicle in space intended for any load on said vehicle. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-169.12, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
41-6-108.10. Vehicle door — Prohibited opening. 
No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on a side available to 
moving traffic unless and until it is safe to do so and can be done without 
interfering with the movement of other traffic, nor shall any person leave a 
door open on a side of a vehicle available to moving traffic for a period of time 
longer than necessary to load or unload passengers. 
489 
41-6-12 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-12. Violation of chapter — Class B misdemeanor, un-
less specified. 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class B misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943, 
57-7-80; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote the section. 
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Purpose of Motor Vehicle Code. 
The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to 
govern the safety of the use and operation of 
motor vehicles, and one who violates provi-
sions of this act is presumed to intend the natu-
ral consequences of his violation; one such pro-
vision is the legislative determination that 
.10% of alcohol in blood content makes it dan-
gerous for a person to operate a vehicle, 
§ 41-6-44.2. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 
(Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 204. 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *» 6. 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers. 
( D A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order 
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are direct-
ing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest 
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways." 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943, 
57-7-81; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment designated the existing paragraph as 
Subsection (1), substituted "peace officer, fire-
man, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school 
crossing guard" for "police officer" and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion; and added Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Obedience to traffic officer. 
Cited. 
Obedience to traffic officer. 
Pedestrian was denied recovery for injuries 
sustained when she was struck by overhang of 
motorbus where from the evidence it appeared 
that when she was half-way across the street 
the traffic light changed against her and she 
stopped in the safety zone, giving the other 
traffic the right-of-way, and that the overhang 
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner 
in response to traffic officer's express direction. 
392 
TITLE 27 
HIGHWAYS 
Chapter 
10. State Highway Patrol. 
12. Highway Code. 
CHAPTER 10 
STATE HIGHWAY PATROL 
Section spection and checking at ports 
27-10-4. Duties of Utah Highway Patrol. o f e n t r y — P o r t personnel. 
27-10-7. Operation and maintenance of in-
27-10-4. Duties of Utah Highway Patrol. 
(1) The Utah Highway Patrol shall: 
(a) enforce the state laws and rules governing use of the state high-
ways; 
(b) regulate traffic on all highways and roads of the state; 
(c) respond to the call of the governor for emergency or other purposes 
at his discretion, and to the call of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Com-
mission in an emergency to enforce the state liquor laws; 
(d) provide security and protection for both houses of the Legislature 
while in session as the speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
president of the Senate finds necessary. 
(2) The Department of Public Safety shall carry out the following for the 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals: 
(a) provide security and protection to those courts when in session in 
the capital city of the state; 
(b) execute orders issued by the courts; and 
(c) carry out duties as directed by the courts. 
History: L. 1941 (1st S.S.), ch. 14, § 5; C. designation (1) at the beginning of the section; 
1943, 36-8-5; L. 1975, ch. 72, § 1; 1983, ch. substituted "Alcoholic Beverage Control Com-
329, § 1; 1988, ch. 152, § 13. mission" for "liquor control commission" in 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1988 amendment, Subsection (lHc); made minor stylistic changes 
effective April 25, 1988, added the subsection in Subsection (1); and added Subsection (2). 
27-10-7. Operation and maintenance of inspection and 
checking at ports of entry — Port personnel. 
(1) The inspection and checking ports of entry constructed, in process of 
construction, or to be constructed by the Transportation Commission, shall be 
operated and maintained by the state highway patrol. Personnel employed to 
1 
STATE v. CHISHOLM 
Cite as 696 PJd 41 (WftshJLpp. 1985) 
Wash. 41 
ed the victim inside the Long Lake resi-
dence by striking or kicking him in the 
nose, that the victim indicated he would 
inform the defendant's parole officer of the 
assault, and that the defendant then decid-
ed to shoot and kill the victim inside the 
moving car, which was at a subsequent 
time and some distance away from the 
initial assault Moreover, Noble's testimo-
ny was consistent with the physical evi-
dence of the victim's facial injuries, as well 
as the physical evidence of a violent epi-
sode at the house and the shooting in the 
car. This evidence, if believed, sufficiently 
supports the separate and distinct nature 
of the two crimes, committed at points dis-
tinct in time and location, so as to warrant 
this issue also going to the jury. See State 
v. Stirgtis, 21 Wash.App. 627, 586 P.2d 532 
(1978). We note in this regard that this 
court only decides the sufficiency of the 
evidence. The credibility of the witnesses 
is for the jury to decide. 
[18] Finally, because the jury found 
that the third aggravating circumstance, 
robbery, did not exist, we do not see how 
the defendant was prejudiced by the 
court's giving of this particular aggravat-
ing circumstance. In any event, there was 
sufficient evidence to support the court's 
instructing on this particular aggravating 
circumstance as well. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
REED, Acting CJ., and PETRIE, J. Pro 
Tern., concur. 
( O f KCYNUMMRSY$TEM> 
39 Wash.App. 864 
The STATE of Washington, Appellant, 
• . 
James V. CHISHOLM, Respondent 
No. 6446-4-II. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 2. 
Feb. 28, 1985. 
The Cowlitz Superior Court, Milton R. 
Cox, J., suppressed evidence and dismissed 
the charge of possession of marijuana, and 
State appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Reed, A.CJ., held that: (1) in appropriate cir-
cumstances a police officer may stop a 
vehicle momentarily to warn the occupants 
that an item of their property is endan-
gered, and (2) reasonableness of stop for 
purpose of informing defendant that his 
hat was in jeopardy of blowing out of bed 
of pickup truck was to be determined by a 
balancing of the individual's interest in pro-
ceeding about his business unfettered by 
police interference against the public's in-
terest in having police officers perform 
community caretaking functions. 
Remanded. 
Petrich, CJ., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Arrest <*»63.5(6) 
A vehicle stop, even for a benign pur-
pose, must be made in harmony with the 
Fourth Amendment proscription against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
2. Arrest *»63.5(4) 
Whether a given stop is unreasonable 
depends on a balance between the public 
interest and the individual's right to per-
sonal security free from arbitrary interfer-
ence by law officers. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 4. 
3. Arrest *=>63.5<4) 
Whether a stop which was made for 
noncriminal, noninvestigatory purposes is 
reasonable depends not on the presence of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, but 
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rather on a balancing of the competing 
interests involved in light of all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. U.S. 
C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
4. Arrest <s=>63.5(6) 
In appropriate circumstances, a police 
officer may stop a vehicle momentarily to 
warn the occupants that an item of their 
property is endangered, and such a momen-
tary seizure, being reasonable, does not 
require the suppression of contraband or 
other evidence of crime thereafter discover-
ed merely because the officer lacked proba-
ble cause or reasonable suspicion to believe 
the vehicle's occupants were involved in 
criminal activity. 
5. Arrest <s=>63.5(6) 
Reasonableness of stop for purpose of 
informing defendant that his hat was in 
jeopardy of blowing out of bed of pickup 
truck was to be determined by a balancing 
of the individual's interest in proceeding 
about his business unfettered by police in-
terference against the public's interest in 
having police officers perform community 
caretaking functions and, in view of factual 
inquiries, the matter was remanded for 
hearing on whether to suppress the quanti-
ty of marijuana found on defendant's per-
son following the stop. 
Carl Berton Paul, Deputy Pros. Atty., 
Kelso, for appellant. 
C. Michael McLean, Longview, for re-
spondent. 
REED, Acting Chief Judge. 
A Longview police officer stopped a pick-
up truck solely for the purpose of inform-
ing the driver that his hat was in jeopardy 
of blowing out of the bed of the vehicle. 
The trial court concluded that, there being 
no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
the stop was improper, and granted defend-
ant's motion to suppress a quantity of mar-
ijuana subsequently found on defendant's 
1. Our research reveals only one case that dis-
cusses a stop made solely to assist the occupant 
of a vehicle. See United States v. Dunbar, 470 
person. The State appeals from the trial 
court's dismissal of the charge against de-
fendant. We reverse and remand. 
On November 15, 1980 at approximately 
12:30 a.m., Sergeant Cowan of the Long-
view Police Department observed a pickup 
truck moving in traffic with a hat resting 
on top of the cab. The officer, driving an 
unmarked police vehicle, watched as the 
hat blew into the bed. Concerned that the 
hat was endangered, Sergeant Cowan at-
tempted to stop the truck. Having no suc-
cess, the officer summoned a marked police 
vehicle to make the stop. No traffic or 
criminal violations were observed or sus-
pected at that time. 
Upon walking up to the cab, Sergeant 
Cowan saw an open can of beer between 
the driver and his passenger, James Chis-
holm, both known by Sergeant Cowan to be 
minors. The occupants were placed under 
arrest and a later search of Chisholm's 
person produced a quantity of marijuana, 
for which he was charged with possession. 
Although there is substantial case law 
concerning the propriety of traffic stops 
made to enforce penal or regulatory law, 
we have found virtually no authority pass-
ing on the propriety of a stop made solely 
to assist the occupants of a vehicle.1 We 
look for guidance, then, in fundamental 
Fourth Amendment principles. A review 
of those principles will provide a frame-
work for a discussion of the specific facts 
present here. 
[1,2] First, we note that a vehicle stop, 
even for a benign purpose, must be made 
in harmony with the Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 
(1979). Whether a given stop is unreason-
able "depends on a balance between the 
public interest and the individual's right to 
personal security free from arbitrary inter-
ference by law officers." United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 
F.Supp. 704 (D.Conn.1979), aff'd 610 F.2d 807 
(2nd Cir.1979). 
2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), 
mara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 
S.Ct 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). 
[3] Ordinarily, the balance between 
public and individual interests is accurately 
measured by the presence or absence of 
"probable cause." On occasion, the less 
demanding "reasonable suspicion" stan-
dard is employed.2 Here, the trial court 
concluded that the absence of reasonable 
suspicion to believe priminal activity was 
afoot rendered the stop unlawful. We dis-
agree. Neither "probable cause" nor "rea-
sonable suspicion" is an appropriate yard-
stick where the stop was made for noncrim-
inal, noninvestigatory purposes. In that 
context, whether a particular stop is rea-
sonable depends not on the presence or 
absence of "probable cause" or "reason-
able suspicion," but rather on a balancing 
of the competing interests involved in light 
of all the surrounding facts and circum-
stances. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct 3092, 49 LEd.2d 1000 
(1976). Here, an individual's interest in 
proceeding about his business unfettered 
by police interference must be balanced 
against the public's interest in having po-
lice officers perform servicess in addition 
to the traditional enforcement of penal and 
regulatory laws. United States v. Dun-
bar, 470 F.Supp. 704 (D.Conn.1979). This 
latter interest is sometimes characterized 
as "community caretaking functions." 
Cody v. Dombrowshi, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 
S.Ct 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). 
[4] One might argue that permitting po-
lice officers to make stops without "proba-
ble cause" or at least "reasonable suspi-
cion" is so fraught with the potential for 
abuse that a blanket proscription is neces-
sary. We believe that such an approach is 
an unnecessarily harsh remedy in light of 
the safeguards offered by a suppression 
hearing. We trust that the trial judge will 
discern a legitimate stop from one based on 
2. See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 US. 1, 88 S.Ct. 
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
3. Many communities look to their officers to 
assist citizens or render aid under a variety of 
STATE v. CHISHOLM Wash. 43 
Cttcas«96P.2d41 (WohJipp. IMS) 
See also Ca- subterfuge. Accordingly, we hold that, in 
appropriate circumstances, a police officer 
may stop a vehicle momentarily to warn 
the occupants that an item of their proper-
ty is endangered. Such a momentary sei-
zure, being "reasonable," does not require 
the suppression of contraband or other evi-
dence of crime thereafter discovered mere-
ly because the officer lacked probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion to believe the 
vehicle's occupants were involved in crimi-
nal activity. 
[5] Turning to the case at bench, the 
balance between the competing interests is 
not such that the court can resolve the 
issue as a matter of law. Factual ques-
tions remain. For example, is it certain 
that the hat was of such trivial value that 
no reasonable person would have bothered 
to warn the owner that it was endangered? 
Was the hat in danger of being lost after it 
blew into the bed of the pickup, or would it 
present a traffic hazard? Was the stop a 
subterfuge? These factual inquiries, 
among others, must be resolved by the trial 
court and the "balancing test" rather than 
the "probable cause" or "reasonable suspi-
cion" test employed. Accordingly, this 
cause is remanded for a suppression hear-
ing consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
J. GUTHRIE LANGSDORF, J. Pro Tern., 
concurs. 
PETRICH, Chief Judge (dissenting). 
The majority states that "the trial court 
concluded that the absence of reasonable 
suspicion to believe criminal activity was 
afoot rendered the stop unlawful." The 
majority goes on to hold that the reason-
able suspicion standard is the inappropriate 
standard to determine the reasonableness 
of stops such as here. While I agree with 
the majority that it is incorrect to apply the 
reasonable suspicion standard, alone, to 
this case, I cannot agree with the majori-
circumstances. For example, officers often de-
liver emergency messages, give directions, 
search for lost children, assist stranded motor-
ists and render first aid. 
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ty's conclusion that the trial court based its 
decision to suppress solely upon the reason-
able suspicion standard. Instead, I believe 
the trial court applied the proper "balanc-
ing" test when it ruled on the motion to 
suppress. 
Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining 
its occupants for even a brief time consti-
tutes a "seizure" within the Fourth Amend-
ment.4 Delaware v. Prouse, supra; State 
v. Larson, 93 Wash.2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 
(1980). A limited investigatory stop may 
be justified on less than probable cause if 
the officer can "point to specific and artic-
ulable facts that give rise to a reasonable 
suspicion that there is criminal activity 
afoot." (Italics mine.) Delaware v. 
Prouse, supra; State v. White, 97 Wash.2d 
92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 
889(1968). 
The majority states that "whether a par-
ticular stop is reasonable depends not on 
the presence or absence of probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion, but rather on a 
balancing of the competing interests in-
volved in light of all the surrounding facts 
and circumstances." I agree that the rea-
sonableness test includes a balancing of the 
competing interests. However, the majori-
ty ignores the fact that the reasonableness 
test requires a certain quantum of evidence 
before the State's interest on balance over-
rides that of the individual.5 "[T]he key 
principle of the Fourth Amendment is rea-
sonableness—the balancing of competing 
interests. But if courts and law enforce-
ment officials are to have workable rules, 
this balancing must in large part be done 
on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, 
case-by-case fashion by individual police of-
ficers. (Citations omitted.) Dunaway v. 
4. The "community caretaking functions" re-
ferred to by the majority are generally commu-
nications between police and citizens involving 
no coercion or detention amounting to a "sei-
zure," and, therefore, are without the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir.1982). 
5. Implemented in this manner, the reasonable-
ness standard usually requires, at a minimum, 
that the facts upon which an intrusion is based 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219-20, 99 S.Ct 
2248, 2260-61, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). 
(White, J. concurring)." 
Furthermore a review of the record indi-
cates that the trial court did not apply the 
"reasonable suspicion" standard per se to 
test this stop as held by the majority. The 
trial court also considered whether an 
emergency situation existed which would 
also justify the stop. The elements of the 
emergency rule are: 
(1) The police must have reasonable 
grounds to believe that there is an emer-
gency at hand and an immediate need for 
their assistance for the protection of life 
or property. 
(2) The search must not be primarily mo-
tivated by intent to arrest and seize evi-
dence. 
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, 
proximating probable cause, to associate 
the emergency with the area or place to 
be searched. 
(Italics mine.) State v. Nichols, 20 Wash. 
App. 462, 465-66, 581 P.2d 1371 (1978). I 
agree with the trial court's implicit finding 
that the facts in this case do not indicate 
there was an emergency at hand that ne-
cessitated police assistance for the protec-
tion of property. Even though not stated 
in its findings or conclusions, it is readily 
apparent from the record that the issue of 
whether an emergency justified the seizure 
was well briefed to the trial court by both 
parties and was decided adversely to the 
state. This is well supported by the State's 
assignment of error to the court's failure 
to find that an emergency situation existed 
which would justify the stop in the absence 
of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activi-
ty. Further, no finding as to a material 
fact constitutes a negative finding. Lob-
dell v. Sugar 'N Spice, Inc., 33 Wash.App. 
be capable of measurement against "an objec-
tive standard," whether this be probable cause 
or a less stringent test. In those situations in 
which the balance of interests precludes insis-
tence upon "some quantum of individualized 
suspicion," other safeguards are generally relied 
upon to assure that the individual's reasonable 
expectation of privacy is not "subject to the 
discretion of the official in the field." Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 VS. at 654-55, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. 
STATE v, 
CUeas«96P.2d4S 
881, 658 P.2d 1267 (1983). Thus, I disagree 
with the majority that the court applied the 
"reasonable suspicion" standard per se 
without balancing the public interest in the 
stop. From the record, it is obvious that 
the trial court found neither reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity nor existence 
of an emergency. Therefore, the majori-
ty's remand for the trial court to resolve 
factual questions, such as whether the hat 
was in danger of being lost or presenting a 
traffic hazard, is simply asking the trial 
court to do what it has already done. 
In my view any exception to the "reason-
able suspicion" standard to be applied to 
noninvestigatory stops should be limited to 
specific, objective facts which reasonably 
give rise to an inference that safety or 
emergency reasons justify the stop.* For 
"[i]t is surely anomalous to say that the 
individual and his private property are fully 
protected by the Fourth Amendment only 
when the individual is suspected of criminal 
behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 528, 530, 87 S.Ct 1727, 1732, 18 
L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). I believe the trial court 
applied the proper balancing in this case. 
I would affirm. 
E KEY NUMMR SYSTEM 
• < V » M ^ V 2> 
40 Wash.App. 27 
The STATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Carl ALLYN, Appellant 
No. 5824-III-7. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division III, Panel One. 
March 7, 1985. 
Review Denied May 24,1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, Chelan County, Fred Van Sickle, 
6. This essentially is the holding of United States 
v. Dunbar, 470 F.Supp. 704 (D.Conn.1979), af-
firmed, 610 F.2d 807 (2nd Cir.1979), which is 
cited by the majority. This is not the only case 
which discusses the validity of noninvestigative 
stops of motor vehicles to assist its occupants. 
See People v. Deppert, 83 Ill.App.3d 375, 38 111. 
ALLYN Wash. 45 
(WohApp. 1985) 
J., of possession of controlled substance, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Green, CJ., held that (1) officers were 
justified in failing to "knock and announce" 
their search of defendant's residence; (2) 
defendant was not entitled to change of 
venue on ground of pretrial publicity; (3) 
trial court did not err in refusing to grant 
continuance after State was permitted to 
make minor amendment to information; 
and (4) allegedly improper statements by 
prosecutor during closing argument did not 
warrant reversal. 
Affirmed. 
1. Searches and Seizures *»3.8(1) 
Noncompliance with "knock and an-
nounce" statute is justified by exigent cir-
cumstances, i.e., facts which cause genuine 
concern for officer's safety or that contra-
band will be destroyed before it can be 
seized. West's RCWA 10.31.040. 
2. Criminal Law «= 1158(4) 
Trial court's findings at suppression 
hearing which are not challenged by de-
fendant are considered verities. 
3. Drugs and Narcotics <&»189 
Where officers had reason to know 
that defendant kept weapons in his resi-
dence and that he had indicated intention to 
use them against police, officers were justi-
fied in failing to knock and announce in 
their search of residence for controlled sub-
stances. West's RCWA 10.31.040. 
4. Jury «=>100 
Mere knowledge of news account 
about accused by juror should not be 
ground for automatic dismissal for cause. 
5. Jury *=>103(1) 
Disqualification of juror is question for 
trial court based on whether, under all cir-
Dec. 675, 403 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); People v. 
Lilly, 38 Ill.App.3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842 (1976). 
These cases held that the stopping of a motorist 
in order to see if the motorist is lost, in need of 
assistance, or having car problems was unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
RUSSELL v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE 
Cite at 706 PJtd 685 (Alaska App. 1985) 
2. Automobiles <*=>349 
Alaska 687 
•ning to the scoring of his essay answers 
*d the adequacy of the model answers. If 
!KL Board finds that a scoring mistake was 
-ude or that a model answer was defec-
t s the Board should correct any error 
jjjcovered. If the Board discovers no such 
€rT0Tf McKay may again appeal to this 
tourt If s u ( * apP^ w e r e to fail, he 
would have to retake the bar examination 
. order to apply for admittance to the 
Alaska Bar Association. 
This matter is REMANDED. 
COMPTON, J., not participating. 
( O | KEY HUM MR SY5TEM> 
Ronald RUSSELL, Appellant, 
v. 
MUNICIPALITY OF 
ANCHORAGE, Appellee. 
No. A-145. 
Court of Appeals of Alaska. 
Sept. 20, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Third Judicial District, Warren 
Tucker and William H. Fuld, JJ., of driving 
while intoxicated and driving with blood 
alcohol level exceeding .10, and he appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Singleton, J., 
held that: (1) temporary stop was justified; 
(2) officers were warranted in asking de-
fendant to submit to field sobriety test; (3) 
arrest was warranted; and (4) there was no 
abuse of discretion in permitting expert 
witness to testify. 
Affirmed. 
Coats, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Bryner, CJ., filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Automobiles <s=>349 
Misted rear window on automobile, by 
analogy to equipment defect, justified tem-
porary stop by police to permit defect to be 
remedied. 
Officers' right to stop defendant to 
insure that obscured rear window could be 
cleared put them in a position to legitimate-
ly observe defendant and discover that he 
had odor of alcohol about his breath, ap-
peared glassy-eyed, and suffered impaired 
coordination, and those additional facts 
warranted officers' shift of focus from ob-
scured rear window to risk that defendant 
might be driving while intoxicated and war-
ranted their asking defendant to submit to 
field sobriety tests. 
3. Arrest <s=>63.1 
Before he may make an arrest, officer 
must be aware of facts and circumstances 
which are sufficient in themselves to war-
rant prudent person in believing an offense 
has been or is being committed. 
4. Automobiles e=>349 
While odor of alcohol or other indicia 
that defendant had been recently drinking, 
standing alone, may not have warranted 
anything beyond an investigatory stop, ad-
ditional evidence that defendant's coordina-
tion was impaired and that he had recently 
been driving was sufficient to warrant his 
arrest. 
5. Criminal Law e=»629 
Prosecution should have given defend-
ant pretrial notice of its intent to call previ-
ously undisclosed expert witness to testify 
concerning analysis of sample of defend-
ant's blood taken following his arrest; 
however, there was no abuse of discretion 
in allowing witness to testify, given record 
establishing that defendant had sufficient 
advance notice to prepare cross-examina-
tion regarding validity of blood test results, 
and fact that defendant and his attorney 
knew results of blood test in view of prose-
cution's intent to call witness and introduce 
blood test results before defendant put on 
case-in-chief and testified. Rules Crim. 
Proc. Rule 16(bXlXi, iv). 
6. Criminal Law <s=*627.8(6) 
Exclusion of significant evidence 
should be used as remedy for discovery 
abuses only in rare situations where there 
is no reasonable alternative. 
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7. Arrest «=>71.1(8) 
Defendant's blood was drawn suffi-
ciently close in time to his arrest that tak-
ing could be justified under Fourth Amend-
ment [U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4] as a 
search incident to arrest. (Per Singleton, 
J., with one Judge concurring.) 
8. Witnesses e=>206 
Personnel in hospital did not qualify as 
representatives of defendant or defend-
ant's lawyer for purposes of blood test 
results; thus, there was no attorney-client 
privilege with respect to blood test results. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 501. 
9. Witnesses e»208(2) 
While blood test may be within physi-
cian-patient privilege, that privilege does 
not apply in criminal cases. Rules of Evid., 
Rule 504(dX7). 
10. Witnesses <S=>184(1) 
It is only where some major public 
policy, clearly articulated constitutional 
provision, statute, or court rule clearly out-
weighs truth-seeking function that an evi-
dentiary privilege should be recognized. 
11. Witnesses «=>184(1) 
Privileges in litigation are not favored 
and should be narrowly construed. 
12. Witnesses <$=>184(1) 
Implied consent law does not privilege 
any blood sample evaluation independently 
procured by a defendant AS 28.35.033(a). 
13. Criminal Law <t=>1038.1(5) 
No plain error occurred from trial 
court's jury instruction as to effect to be 
given intoximeter test results. Rules Crim. 
Proc., Rule 47(b). 
Tina Kobayashi, Asst. Public Defender, 
and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchor-
age, for appellant. 
Dennis P. Cummings, Asst Municipal 
Pros., James Ottinger, Municipal Pros., and 
Jerry Wertzbaugher, Municipal Atty., An-
chorage, for appellee. 
Before BRYNER, CJ., and COATS and 
SINGLETON, JJ. 
OPINION 
SINGLETON, Judge. 
Ronald Russell was convicted of driving 
while intoxicated and driving with a blood-
alcohol level exceeding .10, Anchorage Mu-
nicipal Code § 9.28.020(A) (hereinafter cited 
as AMC). He appeals, contending that his 
seizure and subsequent arrest violated his 
rights under the state and federal constitu-
tions, and that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting expert evidence regarding a blood-
alcohol test performed at Russell's request 
We affirm. 
FACTS 
On May 6, 1983, at approximately 5:20 
a.m., Officers Cooper and Roseman ob-
served an occupied vehicle in an Anchorage 
parking lot. Officer Cooper observed the 
backup lights turn'on and the vehicle back 
up a few feet. He noticed that there was a 
mist on the rear window of the car. Coo-
per stopped the vehicle and spoke to its 
driver, Ronald Russell. He noticed that 
Russell had a strong odor of intoxicants 
coming from his person, watery and glassy 
eyes, and that his coordination appeared 
impaired. Officer Roseman gave Russell 
two verbal tests which were not observed 
by Officer Cooper. Roseman informed 
Cooper of the test results. Cooper then 
asked Russell to perform the finger-to-nose 
test Russell failed this test and Cooper 
arrested him. Russell was transported to 
the police station and was asked to submit 
to an intoximeter examination. He willing-
ly submitted to the intoximeter exam. Af-
ter the intoximeter examination was com-
pleted, Officer Lyon, who performed the 
examination, informed Russell that he 
could obtain an independent test of the 
accuracy of the intoximeter result by hav-
ing a sample of his blood drawn by a quali-
fied person of his choosing at one of the 
local hospitals, and then having the blood 
tested for alcohol. Russell indicated that 
he wished to have an independent test 
done. He was transported by the police to 
Humana Hospital where he signed a con-
sent form and blood was drawn. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. The Investigatory Stop 
[1] Russell argues that he was the vic-
tim of an invalid investigatory stop, and, 
consequently, that the case against him 
ghould be dismissed. He reasons that the 
Alaska Supreme Court has authorized in-
vestigatory stops only where an officer has 
a reasonable suspicion that an imminent 
public danger exists. See Ebona t>. State, 
577 P.2d 698 (Alaska 1978). Officers Coo-
per and Roseman allegedly stopped Russell 
because his misty window obscured his vi-
sion and created a potential traffic hazard, 
in violation of Anchorage Municipal Code 
9.44.360.1 The trial court apparently deter-
mined that the officers were reasonable in 
stopping Russell for this purpose, even 
though it was unlikely that a jury would 
convict him had the case gone to trial. We 
agree that a misted rear window, by analo-
gy to an equipment defect, would justify a 
temporary stop to permit the defect to be 
remedied. See also State v. Chisholm, 39 
Wash.App. 864, 696 P.2d 41 (1985) (police 
may temporarily stop vehicle to warn occu-
pants that item of their property is endan-
gered). In the instant case, it would have 
been a relatively easy matter for Russell to 
clear off his back window. We note that 
there is no suggestion, and the trial court 
did not find, that the officers' concern 
about the misty window was a subterfuge 
to enable the police to seize Russell for 
other purposes. See Chiskolm, 696 P.2d at 
43. 
[2] The officers' right to stop Russell to 
ensure that the obscured rear window 
could be cleared put them in position to 
legitimately observe Russell and discover 
that he had an odor of alcohol about his 
breath, appeared glassy-eyed, and suffered 
impaired coordination. These additional 
facts warranted the officers' shift of focus 
from the obscured rear window to the risk 
that Russell might be driving while intoxi-
1. Anchorage Municipal Code 9.44.360 provides: 
Defective windshields and rear windows pro-
hibited. 
It is unlawful to operate any motor vehicle 
upon a street within the municipality when 
cated. This additional information war-
ranted the officers' asking Russell to sub-
mit to field-sobriety tests. See Romo v. 
Anchorage, 697 P.2d 1066 (Alaska App. 
1985). 
II. The Arrest 
[3] Russell next argues that he was the 
victim of an invalid arrest We disagree. 
Before he may make an arrest, an officer 
must be aware of facts and circumstances 
which are sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a prudent person in believing an of-
fense has been or is being committed. Bis-
tro v. State, 590 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1979); 
Nome v. Ailak, 570 P.2d 162 (Alaska 1977); 
McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 
1971). In addition to Russell's appearance 
and the strong odor of alcohol, the officers 
were aware of his inability to perform cer-
tain tests of manual dexterity. Under the 
circumstances,, they had sufficient informa-
tion to warrant a prudent person in believ-
ing that Russell might be in violation of 
statutes limiting the right of intoxicated 
persons to drive. The following comment 
from a recent opinion is relevant to this 
decision: 
We have found a few cases from other 
jurisdictions holding that a smell of alco-
hol standing alone is insufficient to es-
tablish probable cause to arrest a suspect 
for driving while intoxicated. [Citations 
omitted.] We believe that these cases 
are distinguishable. First of all, we are 
not speaking here of probable cause to 
arrest, but only of reasonable suspicion 
to investigate. The standards are quite 
different. [Citations omitted.] More im-
portantly, the offense of driving with a 
blood-alcohol level of .10 differs substan-
tially from an offense which requires 
proof that a driver's ability to control his 
vehicle was in fact impaired, i.e., a stat-
ute that requires proof of erratic driving. 
And this is so even if the impaired driv-
ing statute permits an inference of DWI 
the windshield or rear window is in such a 
defective condition as to impair the driver's 
vision either to the front or rear. 
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where the state proves a .10 blood level, 
the case in Colorado and Ohio. The leg-
islature in enacting the .10 statutes clear-
ly found that people who have consumed 
sufficient alcohol, but do not necessarily 
manifest impairment in their driving, are 
nevertheless substantially dangerous. 
[Citation omitted.] 
Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069 n.l. 
[4] The foregoing answers Russell's 
contention that it was necessary that the 
officers observe him driving erratically be-
fore they could arrest him. While an odor 
of alcohol or other indicia that a person had 
been recently drinking, standing alone, 
may not warrant anything beyond an inves-
tigatory stop, the additional evidence in 
this case that Russell's coordination was 
impaired and that he had recently been 
driving was sufficient to warrant his ar-
rest Cf Smith v. State, 695 P.2d 1360 
(Okla.Crim.App.1985) (police officer who 
smelled alcohol on defendant's breath and 
noticed that he had bloodshot eyes had 
probable cause to arrest defendant for pub-
lic intoxication). 
III. Testimony of Dr. Propst Concerning 
Russell's Blood Test 
A. Failure to Make Discovery 
Russell argues that the trial court im-
properly permitted the municipality to call 
a previously undisclosed expert witness, 
Dr. Michael T. Propst of Humana Hospital, 
to testify concerning the analysis of the 
sample of Russell's blood taken following 
his arrest Propst testified later, as part of 
the prosecution's rebuttal, concerning the 
analysis of the sample of Russell's blood 
taken at the hospital on the morning of his 
arrest Apparently, the prosecution did not 
give Russell written notice of its intent to 
call Dr. Propst as part of its case-in-chief 
but informed Russell's counsel orally either 
just befoire or during trial. During the 
prosecution's case-in-chief, Russell brought 
the matter before the judge and objected to 
admission of testimony by Dr. Propst. He 
contended that the prosecution had given 
him insufficient notice, and also that the 
blood test was privileged. The court over-
ruled the objection based on privilege, but 
indicated that it would grant defense coun-
sel a continuance in order to prepare for 
cross-examination of the expert. The pros-
ecutor then indicated that it would not call 
the expert as part of its case-in-chief but 
would call the doctor as a rebuttal witness 
if Russell put on a defense. No request 
for a continuance was ever made. 
On appeal, Russell renews his argument 
that Dr. Propst's expert testimony violated 
his discovery rights under Criminal Rules 
16(b)(l)(iv) (prosecutor must disclose to de-
fendant before trial any expert reports in-
cluding scientific tests) and 16(f)(2Xi) (dis-
covery must be made prior to omnibus 
hearing). Russell relies upon Howe v. 
State, 589 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 1979), and 
McCurry v. State, 538 P.2d 100, 106 (Alas-
ka 1975), for the proposition that the state 
must make pretrial disclosure of its experts 
whether it intends to call them as part of 
the case-in-chief or on rebuttal. Russell 
relies particularly on the following lan-
guage in Howe: 
A continuance, however, is at best an 
awkward and disruptive substitute for 
pre-trial discovery. In the case of techni-
cal reports the time needed to prepare a 
response may be too long to hold the jury 
and a mistrial may be the result. More-
over, under certain circumstances such 
as those involving strategic decisions 
concerning the conduct of the trial a con-
tinuance is not an effective substitute for 
pre-trial discovery. See Stevens v. State, 
582 P.2d 621, 625 n.9 (Alaska 1978). 
589 P.2d at 424. 
[5,6] We agree with Russell that the 
prosecution should have given him pretrial 
notice of its intent to call Dr. Propst as a 
witness. Alaska R. of Crim.P. 16(bXlXi), 
(iv). We find no abuse of discretion, how-
ever, in the trial court's decision to permit 
Dr. Propst to testify. This conclusion is in 
accord with our repeated holdings that the 
exclusion of significant evidence should be 
used as a remedy for discovery abuses only 
in rare situations where there is no reason-
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Dr. Propst's testimony that the examina-
tion of Russell's blood disclosed a blood-al-
cohol level in excess of the statutory re-
striction was certainly relevant.2 Thus Dr. 
Propst's testimony is admissible "except as 
otherwise provided" by the constitution, a 
statute, or a court rule. 
[7] Russell argues that his consent to 
the blood test was invalid and that the test 
thereby constituted a warrantless seizure 
of his blood in violation of the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and comparable provisions of our state 
constitution, since he was unaware that the 
test result could be admitted into evidence 
against him. However, at the time Rus-
sell's blood was drawn, he was validly un-
der arrest. The taking of his blood could 
arguably be justified under the fourth 
amendment as a search incident to arrest. 
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (blood 
test of suspected drunk driver valid as 
search incident to arrest); cf. McCracken 
v. State, 685 P.2d 1275 (Alaska App.1984). 
Russell's blood was drawn sufficiently 
close in time to his arrest to satisfy the 
requirements of this exception to the war-
rant requirement. See McCoy v. State, 491 
P.2d 127, 130-31 (Alaska 1971). It is there-
fore unnecessary to decide whether Rus-
sell's "consent" to an independent test con-
stituted a waiver of his fourth amendment 
rights. See McCracken v. State, 685 P.2d 
at 1279 (where a search is valid because 
incident to an arrest, it is irrelevant wheth-
event, we think the distinction in context is 
irrelevant. Russell's argument is predicated, in 
our view, on a misinterpretation of the Alaska 
Supreme Court's decision in McCurry v. State, 
538 P.2d 100, 106 (Alaska 1975). There the 
court held, subject to certain limitations, that 
the state was not under an obligation to disclose 
rebuttal witnesses under the discovery rules, but 
see Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421, 423 (Alaska 
1979). The municipality was clearly obligated 
to disclose Dr. Propst's expected testimony. 
Had adequate notice been given, the municipali-
ty could have used Dr. Propst in its case-in-chief 
without violating McCurry or Howe. Under the 
circumstances, any distinction between evi-
dence-in-chief and rebuttal evidence is simply 
irrelevant. 
•ble alternative. Smaker v. State, 695 
P2d 238, 240 n.2 (Alaska App.1985); Turk 
r State, 662 P.2d 997, 1000 (Alaska App. 
1983); State v. Lewis, 632 P.2d 547, 550 
(Alaska App.1981). The prosecution 
nought to use Dr. Propst as the custodian 
of the blood test results in order to obtain 
the test results' admission under the busi-
ness record exception to the hearsay rule. 
See A.R.E. 803(6). The record establishes 
that the defendant had sufficient advance 
notice to prepare a cross-examination re-
garding the validity of the blood test re-
sults. Since Russell and his attorney knew 
the results of the blood test and also knew 
of the prosecution's intent to call Dr. 
Propst and introduce the blood test results 
before Russell put on his case-in-chief and 
testified, Russell was not subjected to the 
surprise criticized by the supreme court in 
Stevens v. State, 582 P.2d 621, 624 n.9 
(Alaska 1978), where undisclosed prior in-
consistent statements were used to im-
peach the defendant's alibi witnesses. 
B. Privilege 
Russell's privilege argument is more 
troubling. Alaska Evidence Rule 402 pro-
vides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the Consti-
tution of the United States or of this 
state, by enactments of the Alaska Legis-
lature, by these rules, or by other rules 
adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
2. Russell vigorously argues that while possibly 
relevant as evidence in the municipality's case-
in-chief, the evidence was not relevant for rebut-
tal purposes. Russell notes that he did testify 
on direct examination that he was not intoxicat-
ed at the time he was stopped and arrested. He 
contends, however, that Dr. Propst's testimony 
did not, strictly speaking, rebut this testimony. 
We disagree with this contention. If evidence 
that a defendant was driving erratically corrob-
orates the accuracy of a breathalyzer, Byrne v. 
State, 654 P.2d 795 (Alaska App.1982), and evi-
dence that a person appeared sober impeaches a 
breathalyzer result, Denison v. Anchorage, 630 
P.2d 1001 (Alaska App.1981), then evidence of 
an adverse blood test would tend to rebut testi-
mony that a person was not intoxicated. In any 
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er or not defendant consents to the 
search).3 
[8] Russell argues next that the blood 
sample was privileged under the rules of 
evidence. Alaska Rule of Evidence 501 
provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or of 
this state, by enactments of the Alaska 
Legislature, or by these or other rules 
promulgated by the Alaska Supreme 
Court, no person, organization, or entity 
has a privilege to: 
(1) refuse to be a witness; or 
(2) refuse to disclose any matter; or 
(3) refuse to produce any object or writ-
ing; or 
(4) prevent another from being a witness 
or disclosing any matter or producing 
any object or writing. 
Russell relies in part on the lawyer-client 
privilege. A.R.E. 503.4 Alaska Rule of 
Evidence 503(b) provides in relevant part: 
General Rule of Privilege. A client has 
a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential communications made for 
3. Alaska Statute 28.35.032 provides that if a per-
son refuses to submit to a chemical test of his 
breath no test shall be given. This section has 
been interpreted to apply to blood tests. Pena v. 
State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984); Anchorage v. 
Geber, 592 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1979). This stat-
ute has no applicability to Russell, however, 
since he agreed to a breath test and a blood test. 
Consequently, the statutory intent to avoid con-
frontations between police seeking blood sam-
ples and intoxicated individuals resisting blood 
sampling was not involved. Cf. State v. Pitch-
ford, 10 Kan.App.2d 293, 697 P.2d 896, 898 
(1985) (implied consent statute does not pre-
clude blood test unless police ask arrestee to 
submit to a blood or breath test and he refuses). 
In his concurrence, Judge Coats makes a plau-
sible argument that Russell consented to the 
blood test validating it against any claimed vio-
lation of his fourth amendment rights. I prefer 
to view the concerns voiced in Pena and Geber 
regarding AS 28.35.032 as totally distinct from 
the constitutional law governing search and sei-
zure. In my view, statutory limitations on 
searches incident to arrest do not create fourth 
amendment problems where they would not 
otherwise exist. 
the purpose of facilitating the renditio 
of professional legal services to th* 
client, (1) between himself or his repr*. 
sentative and his lawyer or his lawyer* 
representative, or (2) between his lawyer 
and the lawyer's representative, or (3)
 Dy 
him or his lawyer to a lawyer represent-
ing another in a matter of common inter-
est, or (4) between representatives of the 
client or between the client and a repre-
sentative of the client, or (5) between 
lawyers representing the client. 
[9] It is clear, however, that the person-
nel at Humana Hospital do not qualify as 
the representative of Russell or Russell's 
lawyer for purposes of the blood test in-
volved. No lawyer participated in Rus-
sell's decision to have a blood test and the 
lawyer-client privilege has never been ex-
tended to preclude testimony by experts 
consulted by a client without the involve-
ment of an attorney. It is thus unneces-
sary for us to determine whether Russell's 
furnishing blood to employees of Humana 
Hospital constituted a "confidential com-
munication made for the purpose of facili-
tating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client" We find no attor-
ney-client privilege.5 
4. The parties also mention the physician-patient 
privilege in their briefs. A.R.E. 504. It is clear-
ly inapplicable to criminal proceedings includ-
ing misdemeanor prosecutions however. See 
A.R.E. 504(d)(7) (physician patient privilege in-
applicable to criminal proceedings). Cases like 
State v. Pitchford, 10 Kan.App.2d 293, 697 P.2d 
896 (1985) (blood test, taken as part of treat-
ment of injured drunk-driving suspect brought 
to hospital by police, is privileged under Kansas 
physician-patient privilege and is therefore not 
admissible in prosecution of suspect), are there-
fore inapplicable. 
5. Russell's reliance on Houston v. State, 602 
P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979), is misplaced. There, the 
supreme court denied the state pretrial dis-
covery of a defense psychiatric expert's report 
in the absence of evidence that the defendant 
intended to rely upon the expert at trial. The 
opinion turns primarily on the specific language 
of our discovery rules which are inapplicable 
here. The prosecutor did not learn of Dr. 
Propst through a discovery from the defendant; 
he independently developed the lead. While it 
is true that the supreme court speaks of the 
attorney-client privilege in resolving the dis-
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Russell next argues that the implied con-
gent law privileges any blood sample evalu-
ation independently procured by a defend-
ant He relies on AS 28.35.033(e) which 
provides: 
(e) The person tested may have a phy-
sician, or a qualified technician, chemist, 
registered nurse, or other qualified per-
son of the person's own choosing admin-
ister a chemical test in addition to the 
test administered at the direction of a 
law enforcement officer. The failure or 
inability to obtain an additional test by a 
person does not preclude the admission 
of evidence relating to the test taken at 
the direction of a law enforcement offi-
cer, the fact that the person under ar-
rest sought to obtain such an additional 
test, and failed or was unable so to do, is 
likewise admissible in evidence.6 
Russell notes that we referred to the 
right to obtain an additional blood evalua-
tion as an "independent" test in Anchorage 
r. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska App. 
1982), and infers that "independent" means 
"privileged." Russell is incorrect. In 
Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 
1976), the supreme court noted that a 
blood-alcohol test has become virtually con-
clusive proof of guilt of one charged with 
driving while intoxicated. Noting the sub-
covery dispute, it does so in the context of a 
psychiatric examination which necessarily con-
sists of confidential communications. 
6. While a blood test may be within the physi-
cian-patient privilege, that privilege does not 
apply in criminal cases. See A.R.E. 504(d)(7). 
The language in AS 28.35.033(e) which provides 
that "the fact that the person under arrest 
sought to obtain such an additional test, and 
failed or was unable so to do, is likewise admis-
sible in evidence" serves to distinguish this stat-
ute from the one discussed in certain Vermont 
cases which Russell relies upon. See, e.g., State 
v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358 (1983) 
(finding prejudicial error in allowing jury to 
learn that defendant obtained sample for inde-
pendent blood test); State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 
464, 431 A.2d 453 (1981) (error to admit into 
evidence implied consent form given to motor-
ists which showed that an extra blood sample 
had been taken for his independent analysis if 
he so chose). The Vermont statute provides in 
relevant part: 
When a breath test which is intended to be 
introduced in evidence is taken or when 
stantial risk that negligence in performing 
the test or some chicanery in disclosing its 
result could substantially prejudice an inno-
cent defendant, the court held that some 
means must be afforded a defendant to 
independently verify the accuracy of the 
test. We used the term "independent" in 
Serrano with the same meaning, that is, 
"not subject to state or municipal manipu-
lation." "Independent" is therefore not 
synonymous with "privileged." 
[10-12] The evidence rules establish a 
strong public policy that all relevant evi-
dence should be available to the trier of 
fact to ensure a fair and just decision. It is 
only where some major public policy clearly 
articulated in a constitutional provision, 
statute, or court rule clearly outweighs the 
truth-seeking function that a privilege 
should be recognized. Privileges in litiga-
tion are not favored and should be narrow-
ly construed. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 
153, 175-76, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1648, 60 L.Ed.2d 
115, 133 (1979). See also United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-13, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 
3109-10, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1065-67 (1974). 
Alaska Statute 28.35.033(a) does not ex-
pressly establish an evidentiary privilege. 
It would be inappropriate for us to con-
strue it as establishing by implication such 
blood is withdrawn, a sufficient amount of 
breath or blood, as the case may be, shall be 
taken to enable the person, at his option, to 
have made an independent analysis of the 
sample, and shall be held for no more than 
sixty days from the date the sample was tak-
en. 
Any time within that period, the defendant 
may direct that the sample be sent to an 
independent laboratory of his choosing for an 
independent analysis. At no time shall the 
defendant or any agent of the defendant han-
dle or otherwise have access to the sample. 
The results of any independent analysis made 
at the direction of the defendant shall be sent 
only to the defendant or his attorney. Analy-
sis of the person's breath or blood which is 
available to that person for independent anal-
ysis shall be considered valid under the provi-
sions of this section when performed accord-
ing to methods approved by the state depart-
ment of health. 
23 Vt.Stat.Ann. § 1203(a) (Supp.1984) (emphasis 
supplied). 
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a privilege. See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 
674 P.2d 792, 796-97 n.10 (Alaska App. 
1983), petition for hearing granted (Alas-
ka, April 5, 1984) (evidentiary privileges 
should! be established by rule after notice 
and comment by interested parties; a judi-
cial opinion is a poor vehicle for the articu-
lation of a new privilege).7 
IV. Admonition to the Jury 
[13] After successfully moving for the 
suppression of the results of Russell's in-
toximeter test, defense counsel asked that 
the jury be admonished "as to the effect to 
be given the alleged test results." 
The trial court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
The production of evidence in court is 
covered by rules of law. From time to 
time, it's been my duty as judge to rule 
on the admissibility of evidence. You 
must not concern yourself for the rea-
sons for these rulings and you're not to 
consider any testimony or exhibits to 
which an objection was sustained or testi-
mony or exhibits which were ordered 
stricken. 
Russell did not request a further admoni-
tion to the jury regarding the intoximeter 
test. On appeal, he argues that the trial 
court erred by not giving a further admoni-
tion. He does not suggest the form that 
the admonition should have taken. We are 
satisfied that no plain error occurred. 
Alaska R. Crim. P. 47(b). 
The judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
COATS, J., concurs. 
7. Our conclusion in this case makes it unneces-
sary for us to address an issue hitherto unre-
solved by appellate decision in this jurisdiction: 
whether the legislature by statute can establish a 
privilege without violating the supreme court's 
rule-making power. See, e.g., State v. R.H., 683 
P.2d 269, 276 n.8 (Alaska App. 1984). In Perm v. 
State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984), and Anchor-
age v. Geber, 592 P.2d 1187 (Alaska 1979), the 
court interpreted AS 28.35.032 as prohibiting a 
chemical or other test of a person's breath 
where he or she refused to consent. The court 
went on to hold inadmissible evidence obtained 
in violation of this prohibition. While the con-
BRYNER, CJ., dissents. 
COATS, Judge, concurring. 
I concur with Judge Singleton's opinion. 
However, I disagree that Russell's blood 
test can be justified as a search incident to 
an arrest The blood test could not have 
been taken by the police except at Russell's 
request under AS 28.35.033(e). In my 
view, to hold that Russell was subject to a 
blood test as a search incident to an arrest 
would be inconsistent with AS 28.35.032 
which provides that if a person refuses to 
submit to a chemical test of his breath, no 
test shall be given. See Pena v. State, 684 
P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984). It seems to me 
that even though Russell took a breath 
test, the police were not authorized to con-
duct a blood test incident to an arrest un-
less Russell wanted to take a blood test 
under AS 28.35.033(e).. Here, Russell 
agreed to take the test, so the test was 
valid under AS 28.35.033(e). The record in 
this case supports a finding that Russell 
consented to the test. In order to consent 
to the test, Russell did not have to under-
stand that the blood test could later be 
used in evidence against him. See 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (con-
sent to search valid even though consenter 
not specifically informed of right to with-
hold consent). Therefore, I would find that 
Russell consented to the blood test rather 
than that the blood test was valid as a 
search incident to an arrest. In all other 
respects I agree with Judge Singleton's 
opinion. 
BRYNER, Chief Judge, dissenting. 
nection with the evidence rules is not spelled 
out, it appears that the court was finding that 
the suppressed evidence was "illegally obtained" 
and therefore inadmissible. A.R.E. 412. No 
statute expressly prohibits a blood test of a 
person under arrest who agrees to a law en-
forcement officer's request that he submit to a 
chemical test of his breath. Nor does any stat-
ute purport to limit prosecution access to the 
results of independent blood tests performed 
pursuant to AS 28.35.033(c). Thus, Pena and 
Geber are inapplicable to this case. See n.3 
supra. 
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I dissent. counts of sexual abuse of minor in second 
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posed mitigating factor was not established 
by clear and convincing evidence so as to 
affect the presumptive sentence imposed 
upon him. 
Affirmed. 
Bryner, C.J., filed concurring opinion. 
implied consent law by assuring the avail 
ability of a reliable, independent blood test 
to DWI arrestees who might otherwise be 
skeptical about the prospect of submitting 
to the breath test required under the im-
plied consent statutes.2 To read AS 28.35.-
033(e) as permitting routine disclosure to 
the prosecution of blood test results is to 
defeat the very purpose of the statute, 
since such a reading conditions the indepen-
dent test on the arrestee's willingness to 
run the risk of providing the prosecution 
with additional evidence of guilt. I doubt 
that many arrestees will be willing to take 
this risk, and, consequently, few will see 
the opportunity for an independent blood 
test as a realistic incentive to submit to the 
required breath test. The inevitable result 
of the majority's holding in this case will 
simply be to increase the number of people 
who refuse to submit to a breath test. 
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Defendant was convicted of sexual 
abuse of minor in first degree, and two 
I. Where the accused, having obtained a blood 
test, elects to use the results in evidence, the 
privilege arising under AS 28.35.033(e) would, 
of course, be waived. Similarly, if evidentiary 
use of blood test results is contemplated by the 
defense, those results will be subject to dis-
covery under Criminal Rule 16 to the same 
extent as other test results prepared for trial at 
the direction of the accused or counsel for the 
accused. 
1. Criminal Law <*=»1208.1(3) 
Whether aggravating or mitigating 
factors are established so as to affect pre-
sumptive sentence imposed upon defendant 
for sexual abuse of a minor is a decision 
committed to sound discretion of trial 
court. AS 11.41.434(aX2XB), 12.55.125(i), 
11.41.436(a)(3)(B), 12.55.155(d)(9). 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1158(1) 
Court of Appeals may reverse trial 
court's decision on whether aggravating or 
mitigating factors are present so as to af-
fect presumptive sentence imposed on de-
fendant for sexual abuse of a minor only if 
it is convinced that trial court was clearly 
erroneous in the conclusions it reached. 
AS 11.41.434(a)(2)(B), 11.41.436(a)(3)(B), 
12.55.125(i), 12.55.155(d)(9). 
3. Criminal Law <^ 1158(1) 
Given defendant-father's continued ef-
forts to justify his sexual contact with his 
child as "sex education" and his only limit-
ed acceptance and understanding of grave 
risks of psychological damage to children 
that his conduct presented, trial judge was 
not clearly erroneous in concluding that 
2. This purpose is reflected in Vermont's inde-
pendent blood test statute, which is similar to 
Alaska's statute but expressly privileges blood 
test results. See 23 Vt.Stat.Ann. § 1203(a); 
State v. Normandy, 143 Vt. 383, 465 A.2d 1358 
(1983); State v. Raymond, 139 Vt. 464, 431 A.2d 
453 (1981). 
attention to this particular vehicle? 
A Yes. As I stated, I was northbound on Wall 
A v e n u e . The vehicle made a left-turn in front of me at the 
light at 21st and Wall Avenue. As the vehicle made the 
left turn a door, a passenger door, into the rear of the 
motor home, was swinging open. I noticed the vehicle make 
another left turn back onto 20th Street going westbound, 
once again the door swinging open. I pulled the vehicle over 
simply to advise the driver of the condition of the door so 
that nothing would fall out. 
Q All right, where did that stop occur at? 
A About a block west of Wall Avenue on 20th 
Street. 
Q All right. Was there anything unusual about 
the driving, other than the door swinging and --
A The only other thing was that it made an 
improper turn as it turned from Wall Avenue onto 20th Street. 
The law states that you should turn from the left-most lane 
into the left-most lane and he made a wide turn into the 
right lane. .. 
Okay. That wasn't your reason for stopping ' 
him? 
Q 
A 
Q 
That was not. 
All right. Did you notice anything unusual 
as you proceeded to stop the vehicle, reaction tir/.e or 
anything of that nature? 
A Before I had him pull over? 
Q Yes. 
A No. He pulled over right shortly after 
the red light was on him. 
Q All ri<;ht, did you approach the vehicle? 
A I did. 
Q Was someone seated behind the wheel? 
A• As I went up along the left side of the 
vehicle, the driver got out of the vehicle. I saw him get 
out of the vehicle and we met alongside of the motor home. 
Q Okay. Was there anyone else in the motor 
home? 
A There was not. 
Q Upon approach, did the Defendant say anything 
to you, Officer? 
A I don't recall any conversation at that 
moment, no. 
Q All right. And did you inform him as to why 
you stopped him? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q All right, and what did you tell him the 
reason was that you stopped him? 
A I stated that he had a door open on the back 
of the motor home and at that time we walked together around 
10 
to the back of the motor hone to the right side of the 
motor home. He walked around the corner -- there were 
actually two doors opened that I hadn't noticed previously. 
One is a tool or equipment door that is to the rear of the 
passenger door that I was referring to. He walked up and 
closed that and made the comment such a s , "I told her to 
close that." And I told him, the driver of the vehicle, I 
says, "That wasn't the door that I was referring to. I meant 
the passenger door." 
Q Okay. 
A And he went up and closed that. 
Q Uhere was this passenger door at, can you 
describe the motor home for me? 
A As the motor home sits, this is the driver 
and passenger portion of ths vehicle. It's a modular, I 
believe, type of motor home. In other w o r d s , the front of 
the vehicle is a regular Dodge/Chevy/Ford, whatever type 
front end of the vehicle, with the motor home part. As the 
driver gets in here, going around the rear, the door is 
probably in the rear third of the right side of the vehicle. 
Q Okay. So then the door that was swinging 
open entered directly into the compartment? 
A The motor home part of the vehicle. 
Q All right. And is there some type of 
partition between the driving portion of the vehicle and the 
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motor home portion of the vehicle? Can you go from the seat, 
driver's seat, back into the motor home? 
A Yes, you can. 
Q All right. Was there anything that made you 
go beyond that point of a routine traffic stop, anything 
about the Defendant? 
A Yes. Almost immediately, as soon as he 
stepped out of the vehicle, and came towards me, both by his 
demeanor, his gait, the appearance of his face, I suspicioned, 
I didn't ask any questions or say anything until the point 
where we had gone around to the doors, he had closed both of 
the doors, we had stepped back in between his motor home and 
my vehicle. At that time I said, "Have you had anything to 
drink?" 
Q Did he respond to that? 
A He did. 
Q Did you make a note of what he said? 
A Yes. He said, "Hey, I have had a little to 
drink, but I am just going to the Flying J to get gas because 
I've got to go to a funeral in Idaho tomorrow. 
Q Okay. When you say you noticed his gait, 
can you describe his gait for me? 
A Not a very real steady sure walk, more of 
possibly using the motor home to maintain balance as he 
walked around it. 
12 
1 ! Q Did you notice anything -- any other physical 
2 | c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s about him once you got him between the 
3 vehi cles? 
4 ; A Just glassy-eyed a p p e a r a n c e , somewhat 
5 slurred speech and repetitive speech, 
e Q All right. Based upon y o u r stop and what 
7 • you o b s e r v e d when you stopped, did you d e t e r m i n e to administerj 
8 Field S o b r i e t y Tests? 
9 A Y e s , I d i d . 
10 Q All right. Do you have a standard b a t t e r y 
11 of tests that you normally administer? 
12 A Y e s , I do. 
13 Q All right. Please tell me what those tests 
u are. 
15 A Those three t e s t s , I g e n e r a l l y do them in 
16 this o r d e r . First is the walk and turn test, the second is 
17 the one-leg stand test, and the third test is an eye test 
is or a Gaze M y a s t a g m u s T e s t . 
19 Q All right. And where w e r e these administered? 
20 A In between -- in off of the side a little 
21 bit of my patrol v e h i c l e and in between the two v e h i c l e s , his 
22 and n i n e . 
23 - Q Okay. Do you recall the road surface that 
24 you a d m i n i s t e r e d those tests on? 
25 A Y e s , I do. 
13 
Q Okay, and what was that? 
A The road in that area is cement. It was 
fairly level, there were no white painted lines convenient. 
There were slight pebbles and rocks along the area that we 
were on. 
Q Okay. Did you call for a backup prior to 
administering the Field Sobriety Tests? 
A I don't remember at what point I asked for a 
backup. I think it may have been a little bit later. 
Q All right. But you did in fact call for a 
backup? 
A I did. 
Q All right. You stated that the first test 
that you gave was the walk and turn test. Did you in fact 
demonstrate that to the Defendant? 
A Y e s , I did. 
Okay. And did you also explain it to him? 
I did. 
All right. What specifically was he required 
A 
Q 
to do? 
A What I asked Mr. Wells to do is first stand 
while I gave him the directions that I wanted him to do 
after I performed it. I said, :: I want you to walk eight 
steps on an imaginary line, eight steps east, turn on that 
imaginary line making sure you are touching heel to toe, heel 
14 
to toe, heel to toe, and walk six steps back counting 
those steps outloud. 
Q All right. Did you demonstrate that for 
him? 
A 
Q 
stood? 
I demonstrated it. 
All right. Did he indicate that he under-
A He didn't say that he didn't understand at 
that time. 
Q 
all? 
A 
Q 
this test? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
first time? 
A The first time he started, he made two ste 
Host his balance into me, he stopped. He says, "Will you 
tell me what to do again?" 
Q Did you? 
A I did. I explained it again. He then 
started walking east again. He counted eight, this time n 
Okay. Did you have to repeat yourself at 
I did, yes. 
All right. Did Mr. Wells in fact attempt 
Y e s , h e d i d . 
How many times did he attempt it? 
At least twice. 
All right. Can you tell me how he did the 
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touching heel to toe, as much as three to four inches kept 
in between the steps. He side stepped once meaning that 
as the imaginary line goes here he had to make a step 
off of that imaginary line to maintain his balance. He 
then lost his balance on the turn and stopped the test. 
Q All right. What was the second test that 
was admi ni stered? 
It's the one-leg stand test. 
All right. And did you demonstrate that 
Yes, I did. 
What specifically was he required to do? 
My instructions to him were, "First I want 
you to stand facing me, pick wherever you want, a level 
spot. I want you to just put your feet together and then 
using either leg you want, put one of those legs in the air 
approximately six inches and count in this manner, 1,001, 
1 ,002, 1 ,003 to 1 ,030." 
Q Okay. Did he attempt to do that? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q All right. How many times? 
A Did I explain for him to do it? 
Q How many times did he attempt to do it. 
A Did he attempt to do it? 
Q Yes. 
8 
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A 
Q 
f o r him? 
A 
Q 
A 
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A Just once, I believe. 
Q All right, and how did he do on that? 
A Poor. He got 1,003, 1,004, stopped, his 
balance was yery poor, and stated that he couldn't do it. 
Q All right. How was his attention to you when 
you were explaining the test? 
A* He stood there as if he was watching and 
paying attention. 
Q All right. Did he appear to be swaying? 
A Well --
Q While you were explaining the tests to 
him? 
A While I was explaining, yeah there was a 
c e r t a i n — 
Q Okay. Did he require anything to help him 
maintain his balance? 
A While I explained this particular test, 
where he was standing he rested against the back of the motor 
home. 
Q Okay. What was the third test that you 
administered? 
A It's an eye test. 
Q All right. And have you been specifically 
trained to administer this eye test? 
A Yes, I have. 
17 
1-1 
2 . 
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Q Okay, and what training have you had? 
A Both in the Basic Gaze Myastagnus class, I 
believe it is a one-day class, and also actually performing 
this test on inebriated subjects at a certain given level 
o f i n t o x i c a t i o n . 
Q Okay. How long ago was thai that you had 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 ; 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
the training? 
A 
ago. 
Q 
It's been a year and a half, two years 
Okay. How many opportunities have you had 
since then to administer that test? 
A Many times. 
g- All right. What specifically do you do when 
i 
you administer a Gaze Hyastagnius lest? 
i 
A What I have them do, first thing I do is ask ! 
if they wear contacts. The Defendant stated that he did 
not wear contacts. I took out my pen, not this specific pen, 
I asked him, "I want you to focus your eyes on the top part 
of this \)en. I am going to move that side to side in front of 
your head." 
Q Okay. 
A I hold that just slightly above the plane of 
the eyes and about two feet distance from the eyes and I 
move that in this manner and then I say, "What I want you to 
do is focus your eyes on the pen and move your eyes vnth the 
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pen. I don't want you moving your head side to side, keeping 
your head straight ahead." j 
Q All right. What specifically are you j 
i 
looking for when you administer thai? j 
A What we are looking for is, you are noting 
the entire colored portion of the eyes as the eyes follow that 
from side to side. A sober person can generally follow that 
in a \/ery smooth fashion. A person, as I have been trained 
to do, at a level 10 or above, does not follow that very 
smoothly. In other words, the colored part of the eyes was 
actually in a jerking motion as it goes across. And there 
is actually three tests you accomplish during this with each 
eye. 
Okay. Did you administer that test? 
Y e s , I did. 
And how did the Defendant do? 
First off, he did poor following directions 
I asked him to keep his head looking straight 
ahead and focus it. As I brought that a c r o s s , his eyes would 
stay at a fixed gaze at a particular thing rather than 
actually following the pen as I brought it across. He did;' 
mention once about the light. I had the light in a fashion 
Hike this so it is showing up. He stated once that the 
lights were -- I believe it may have been the lights from the 
patrol car, I don't remember, were in his eyes. I readjusted, 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
on this one 
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putting myself in between the patrol car and himself. 
Q Okay. And did he have difficulty following 
those instructions? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Were you ever able to successfully accomplish 
the Gaze Hyastagmus Test? 
•A Not totally as is required. I did notice 
a very distinct jerkiness in the eye novement as he moved 
across the full pen. I never did really get hin at -- the 
eyes at full deviation and I did notice the onset of this 
was prior to 45 degrees. 
Q I don't recall if I asked you, what time was 
it that you stopped Mr. Wells? 
A It was probably shortly after 10:00 p.m., 
approximately 2200, 2204, 2205, when I first saw the 
individual. 
Q Okay. 
A Made the stop. 
Q Based upon your observations of : 1 r. Wells, 
how he did on the Field Sobriety Test, did you determine to 
place him under arrest? 
A I did. 
Q Did you in fact do that? 
A Yes, I did. 
g And was that done at the scene? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
It was. 
Do you recall what time the arrest was? 
Yes. It was 15 minutes after 10:00. 
All right. What did you do once you 
placed him under arrest? 
A I handcuffed the individual, did a brief 
patdown frisk and placed hin in the front seat of my car. 
Q All right. Did you search the vehicle 
driven by Mr. Wei 1s? 
A I did not. 
Q Did someone search that vehicle? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. Was that a backup that you had 
requested? 
A 
Q 
Yes, that's correct. 
All right. In fact, who -- when you 
requested backup, who arrived at the scene, Trooper? 
A As soon as I called, Officer iiatt Zwemke 
from the sheriff's office stated ihat he was fairly close 
in the area. He was the first officer to arrive; shortly 
after Scott Smith of the highway patrol arrived. 
Q All right. Did you transport Mr. Wells to 
ine Weber County Jail? 
A I did. 
"~ Q All rioht. Did anyone else ride with you? 
} 
» 
J 
f 
j 
1 i A N o . 
! 
2.: Q Was anything unusual said during that 
i 
3 transport b e t w e e n yourself and Mr. Wells? 
4 A There was c o n v e r s a t i o n , nothing that I have 
5 w r i t t e n down or recall at this time. 
e Q Okay. Did you drive into the Weber County 
7 Jail garage? 
8 A Y e s , I d i d. 
9 Q Did you have an o p p o r t u n i t y to observe the 
10 D e f e n d a n t get out of the car? 
11 A Y e s , I did. 
12 Q Was there anything unusual about his getting 
13 out or the way he walked once he got out? 
u = A Just that -- somewhat staggering motion and 
15 ; the fact that he was a little off balance with the handcuffs. 
16
 ; Q O k a y . What did you do upon arrival? 
IT A At the jail, we went in in front of the cage, 
is We once a g a i n , I b e l i e v e , one of the jail employees patted 
19 him down, we took the handcuffs off, I requested 
20 o p p o r t u n i t y to go back into the intoxilizer room 
21 Mr. Wells the test and we did so. 
22 Q All right. Can you tell me what 
23 when you got inside the intoxilizer room? 
2-: A Y e s . As we got back t h e r e , I once again 
25 stated that we -- this is what I wanted to do is perform an 
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intoxilizer test on an individual. I pulled out the check-
list, the test record, inserted it into the machine. The 
intoxilizer had been on and so it was warmed up and ready to 
go and I proceeded through the checklist as I had been in-
structed to do. 
Q You are presently a certified intoxilizer 
operator? 
A Yes , I am. 
Q Okay. What happened when you got to step 6? 
A When I got to step 6, after going through 
1 thru 5 without having any problems at all, I separated the 
two rubber tubes coming out of the intoxilizer machine and I 
put a fresh, clean mouthpiece into the tube into which the 
breath sample is taken. I asked Mr. Wells to blow into 
that, I gave him the instructions that I needed your deep 
lung air, "Please breathe into that until that breath is 
completely gone,'5 and I also advised him that I needed the 
green light on the intoxilizer machine to come on for about 
three seconds before it would stamp. 
He went ahead and took the breath tube, 
breathed into the tube. I watched the indications on the , 
digital readout as it went up and the green light just 
flickered off for a brief second, not even a second, and 
Mr. Wells stopped. 
I said, "Mr. Wells, I need that deep lung 
23 
and I need that light to come on for three seconds," and 
from this point on, he never, in my opinion, breathed through 
the mouthpiece again. 
Q Were you ever able to get a readout on the 
test record out of the machine? 
A No, I did not. 
Q T h e r e was never a p r i n t o u t t h a t was made? 
A T h e r e w a s n 1 t . 
i 
Q All right. What did you do at that point? j 
A I -- once again, I told him, I says, "Mr. j 
i 
Wells, you are not giving me a breath sample, please," and j 
he made a couple of other attempts at this. He would put j 
I 
his mouth on the mouthpiece, his cheeks would go up, his eyes I 
would bulge a little bit, but there was no air exchange | 
! 
through the mouthpiece. j 
i 
I stated once again, I says, "Mr. Wells, I ! 
have got to have you breathe into this or we are not going to 
get a breath sample, it is not going to stas:ip, and I will 
have to refuse you." 
Q All right. What happened? 
A At this time he became a little irate. There 
happened to be a couple of jailers outside the door in the 
hallway, he started talking loud enough and I motioned for 
them to come in, at his request, so that they could observe 
the fact that, in his mind, he was blowing into the machine. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
Okay. Did the jailers, in fact, cone in? 
They did. 
All right. What happened after that, did 
A 
Q 
A 
you, in fact, refuse him? 
A I did refuse hin at that point, y e s . 
Q Okay, did you give him the admonition? 
I did. 
All right. What happened after that? 
After that we left the intoxilizer room and 
went back out and the individual was booked into jail. 
Q Okay. Did you have occasion to give him 
his rights per the Miranda decision? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And where was that at? 
That was out at the scene in my vehicle. 
Okay. Did he indicate that he understood 
those rights? 
A Let me 
once again, was given 
under arrest. 
Q Okay, so that's actually the scene before 
you came to the jai 1 ? 
A That* s correct. 
Q Did the Defendant indicate that he understood 
t h o s e r i g h t s ? 
A 
Q 
to my notes on that. Okay, that, 
and shortly after placing him 
2b 
1 A Y e s , he did. 
2 I Q Understanding those rights, did he waive 
I 
3 those rights and agree to talk to you? 
4 i A His statement to me, after I asked him this 
5 right off the report form, "Having these rights in mind do 
6 you wish to talk to me now," his response is, "What do you 
7 want to know?" 
8 Q Okay, Did you go through the standard 
9 j i ntervi ew? • 
10 ; A Y e s , I did. 
11 .! Q All right. Was that filled out at the 
12 time while you were still sitting there at the scene? 
13 ; A I believe it w a s , while I was waiting for the 
u ; wrecker at the scene. 
15 Q All right. Did the Defendant admit the fact 
ie • that he was operating the vehicle? 
17 MR. HANDY: I object, that is a leading 
is question. 
19 THE COURT: Sustained. 
20 Q ((By Mr. Heward) Did you have occasion to 
21 go through the interview form? 
22 A Y e s , I did. 
23 Q All right. Did you have an occasion to ask 
2- the Defendant if he was operating a motor vehicle? 
25 A Y e s , I did. 
*6 
Q And his response? 
A His response to m e , "God, just go to j a i l . 
Get the shit over with." 
Q All right. Did you also have occasion to 
ask him if he had been drinking? 
A Yes, I did. 
•Q And what was his response to that? 
A "Hell, you arrested me for it." 
Q Did you ask him what he had been d r i n k i n g ? 
A I did. 
Q And what was his response? 
_^> A His answer was "beer." 
Q Did you ask him how much he had been d r i n k -
ing? 
A I did. 
Q His response? 
A Four or five. 
Q Did you ask him when his first drink w a s ? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And his response? 
A J U S T : prior to that I asked him where he had 
been drinking and he said his house. When I asked him, ,:Wher 
aid you have your first drink?" he stated when he had left 
his house. 
Q And did you ask him about his last drink? 
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A I did, and his response w a s , "When stopped." j 
Q Okay. Did you have occasion to ask him if j 
he was on any pills or m e d i c a t i o n , drugs of any kind? j 
A I did. 
Q" And hi s response? 
A He stated that he was taking some pain 
pills. 
Q Did he tell you what kind? 
A He could not remember the exact form in 
that case, what it was called. 
Q Did he have any with him? 
A He did not. 
Q Did you ask him when his last dose was? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And his response? 
A Two hours ago he took a half a pill. | 
Q Okay. Did you inquire of him w h e t h e r he was j 
i 
ill or suffering from any sicknesses? | 
i 
A Yes, I did. j 
j 
Q A n d h i s r e s p o n s e ? . j 
A N e g a t i v e . I 
t 
Q While you were administering the Field Sobriety! 
Test, did you have occasion to ask him whether or not he had | 
any physical infirmities that would restrict his ability to do ! 
this? I 
A 
Q 
A 
Y e s , I did. 
And what did he respond to that? 
He stated he had arthritis in his hands but 
his legs were okay. 
Q Okay. Trooper, how long have you been with 
the highway patrol? 
A Fourteen y e a r s . 
Q In those fourteen years, have you had 
occasion to make DUI arrests? 
A Many, yes. 
Q All right. Have you had occasion to see 
people who were intoxicated to a level they can't safely 
operate a motor vehicle? 
A Many times. Y e s , I have. 
Q Based upon your observation on this particular 
evening with the Defendant, Mr. Wells, do you have an opinion 
as to his ability to safely operate a motor vehicle at this 
t i m e a n d p 1 a c e ? 
A I felt, after the conversation about the 
doors, talking with him then, that he had been drinking and 
after performing the Field Sobriety Test that he was 
definitely too much under the influence to safely drive the 
vehi cle. 
MR. HEWARU: Thank you. No further 
questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Handy? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
SY MR. HANDY: 
Q Just briefly then, Trooper, you are going 
north on Wal1 --
A That's right. 
Q -- in the vicinity of what? 
A 20th, 21st, 22nd, where state road 104 comes 
into the one way.--
Q All right. 
A -- eastbound, and one lane westbound. 
Q And Mr. Wells was going in what direction? 
A He was coming off of, I put 22ndi I'm not 
sure even what it was. But it's 21st coming off of state 
road 104, going north on Wall. And then he made another --
within a block another turn again onto 104. 
Q You were not following him then, he was 
coming towards you, is that right? 
A No. I was --
Q You are going north on Wall? 
A North on Wall and he is coming --
Q t a s t. 
A -- off of state road 104, making a left turn 
in front of me. 
Q Okay. So -- and your attention was called t 
3 
this vehicle because the door was open? 
A That's correct. 
Q And as a courtesy you stopped him to tell hi 
that his door was open, because apparently he didn't know 
that. 
A That 1 s correct. 
.Q And so there was nothing at all about 
this man's driving pattern that you would say, from your 
experience of 14 years as a Trooper, this nan -- there's 
something wrong with the man who is driving this vehicle and 
he might be intoxicated, there was nothing at all about 
that --
A No. 
Q Okay. So how long were you able to observe 
him driving his vehicle, what distance or so forth? 
A A block and a half. 
Q So you followed him for a block and a 
half. 
A I wasn't really following him, he was at a 
light ahead of me as I was at this light. He made the turn 
again and then I just proceeded up there. 
Q You observed him a block ahead? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. And nothing, from your observation, 
would indicate to you, as a trained T r o o p e r , thai this man 
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may be under the influence of intoxicants while driving a 
vehicle? 
A That wasn't on my mind, no. 
Q All right, but that's what you are trained 
to observe though, as citizens go up and down the highway, 
isn't it? 
All right, so then -- so you had no reason 
for pulling him over except for the doors are open and you 
want to see that they get closed? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. And so the first thing that you 
said to him was thai, "Your door is open, sir," when he got 
out? 
A (Inaudible response.) 
Q All right. In regard to the Myastagmus Test 
that you have been trained in regard to, do all individuals 
who have consumed the sane amount of alcohol, regardless of 
shape, size, heighth, weight, age, do they all react the 
same, their eyes react the same? 
A I'm not sure I understand -- I'm not sure I 
do know. 
Q Let me try and -- you administered a 
Myastagmus Eye Test? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Okay. And you have described that to us. If 
32 ! 
name? 
MR. HEWARD: I believe it is Z-W-E-M-K-E. 
MATT ZWEMKE, 
•>• ' was called as a witness for 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff 
and testified upon his oath as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. HEWARD: 
Q Would you please give us your full name and 
occupation? 
A Deputy Matt Zwemke, Weber County Sheriff's 
Office. 
Q How long have you been so employed? 
A About four years. 
Q What is your present duty assignment? 
A I work in the Warrants Jivision presently. 
Q What was your duty assignment on the 15th of 
June 1988? 
A I was in the Patrol Division in the 
Sheriff 1s Office. 
Q Okay. Were you in fact working on June 15, 
1983? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Did you have occasion to respond to a 
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1 ! that his voice was a little bit slurred, a little bit slow in 
2 : speech. 
3' Q Okay, Had you ever seen iir. Wells before the 
4 night of the 15th? 
5 A I had not. 
6 Q To the best of your knowledge, have you ever 
7 heard him speak? 
8 A Ho, I have not. 
9 Q During your employ as a deputy sheriff, 
10 have you had occasion to come in contact with people who are 
11 intoxicated? 
12 : A Yes, I have. 
13 | Q Have you had occasion to hear people speak 
14; who you thought their speech was slurred? 
15 : A Yes, I have. 
16' Q Did ;1r. Wells' speech appear to be consistenl 
17
 ; wi th that? 
18 i A Yes, it did. 
19 Q What happened after that, Deputy? 
20: A Well, myself and Trooper Smith did an 
21 inventory on the motor home and started filling out a State 
22 impound sheet, inventorying the objects within the motor 
23 home. 
24 Q Do you recognize what has been narked as 
25 State's Proposed No. 1? 
in this case? 
A No. 
Q You didn't proceed to the jail? 
A No. 
Q Never had an opportunity to observe the 
6
 ; Defendant outside of the car? 
i 
i 
7
 J A' N o , I did not. 
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S m i t h . 
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BY MR. 
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HEWARD: 
Q 
A 
g 
A 
Okay. 
MR. HEWARD: No further questions, Your 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Heward. 
MR. HANDY: I have no questions. 
MR. HEWARD: You may step down. Call Scott 
SCOTT SMITH, 
was called as a witness for 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff 
and testified upon his oath as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
State your ful1 name. 
E. Scott Smith. 
And your occupation? 
Trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q 
A 
Q 
How long have you been so employed, Scott? 
It will be 10 years in October, 
Calling your attention specifically to the 
15th day of June, were you employed by the highway patrol 
on that day? 
A Yes, 
Q. Were you working on that day? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have occasion to respond to a 
request for backup from Trooper Ball? 
A 
Q 
eveni ng? 
Yes, I did. 
At approximately 10:00 o'clock in the 
Yes. A 
Q All right. Did you come in contact with the 
Defendant, Mr. Wells? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your involvement out there, 
Trooper? 
A I heard over the radio, I wasn't sure who it 
was, asked for backup. And I asked the Dispatcher what and 
I did hear the location and I also heard Deputy Zwemke say 
that he was close and he was on another stop and that he 
would be through and go over that way. 
Q Okay. What did you do when you arrived? 
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A I pulled up behind Deputy Zwemke's car and 
got out. I think either Dave was -- just handcuffed him or 
just finished with him and he was -- as I got out of the 
car and walked up, he took a hold of fir. Wells and was help-
ing him back to the patrol car. 
Q Okay. When you say Dave, is that Trooper 
Ball? 
A Yes. 
Q Did it appear to you that Trooper Ball, in 
fact, had to assist Mr. Wells back to the car? 
A Yes. Dave took a firm hold on hin. It 
didn't appear that he was afraid that he was going to 
escape, he just wanted to make sure, because he was handcuff-
ed, that he didn't fall, that he had a good grasp on him, 
tnat he could hold him up. 
Q All right. Did you have an opportunity to 
observe the Defendant anytime that evening? 
A Yes. 
Q When was that? 
A When he walked him back and put him in the 
car and also a time while he was in the car at various times 
I was up at the motor home and then before Trooper Ball left 
for the jai1 . 
Q Did you notice anything unusual about the 
Defendant? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, he looked quite a bit different then 
Than he does today? 
Yes. 
How so? 
A His hair was all messed up, his shirt was 
unbottoned quite a ways, he was boisterous, seemed to be 
rather obnoxious. 
Q Were you able to observe any characteristics 
in his face, eyes, anything? 
A His eyes appeared to be glassy, blood shot. 
Q Okay, those observations were made from 
where? You were outside the vehicle? 
A Well, I was -- I was coming up as Dave was 
coming back and so he kind of passed and I helped with the 
door, hold the door, and then also outside the vehicle. 
Q All right. Could you detect any odors? 
I think there was an odor of alcohol. 
What did you do after that, Trooper? 
I helped Deputy Zwemke with the impound. 
All right. I am showing you what is marked 
State's Proposed No. 1. Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Would you tell me what it is? 
A A bottle of Canadian, I guess L-T-D, 
whiskey. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Q (By Mr. Handy) As a matter of fact, aren't 
all people's eyes somewhat bloodshot? Isn't that how you --
excuse me. 
A I wouldn't say all people, no. 
Q W e l l , if I were looking at your right now, 
I couldn't see if you had any veins in your eyeball at 
all. 
"V... 
A I don't know how good your eyesight is. 
Q' Well - -
A You know, some people have some. This was --
I mean we are talking bloodshot. We are not talking, you 
know, average few. I mean -- I stop thousands of people a 
year and tens of thousands of people in my work, and I guess 
everything is relative. So I base this on all those thou-
sands of people I stop. His eyes were more bloodshot than 
the average person. Quite a bit more. 
Q You don't know whether that was standard 
for him though. 
A W e l l , I've really never seen anybody that 
had, you know, bloodshot eyes -- that bloodshot eyes all the 
time. 
Q Did you flash your light at his eyes? 
A No. 
g How close were you to him when you observed 
him? 
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A I walked -- right by my face. 
Q Did you -- as you did that, did you say, "I 
have got to look at his eyes and see if they are bloodshot 
because I nay be testifying about this"? 
A No. 
Q All right. Okay. Then Mr. Heward asked 
you if you had detected an odor of a l c o h o l . Now your answer, 
as I wrote down, is, "I think there was an odor of a l c o h o l . " 
Do you recall saying that? 
A Yes. 
Q Did I recite that correctly? 
A That's correct. 
Q That indicates to r.ie a little u n c e r t a i n t y , 
Officer Smith --
A Well --
Q -- when you say, UI think there was an odor 
of alcohol." 
A My nose isn't real good and it wasn't my 
arrest, you know. But I sort of remember Deputy Zwenke 
mentioned to me about, "Boy, do you smell t h a t ? " or some-
thing like that. 
Q You seem to remember that? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. Do you know w h e t h e r or not Deputy 
Zwenke had been drinking on that o c c a s i o n ? 
A I doubt that. 
Q Or Officer Ball? Or where the odor of 
alcohol was coming from if it came from anybody? 
A I know that O f f i c e r Ball doesn't drink. 
Q All right. He doesn't appear to be the typ 
that would e i t h e r . All right. 
MR. HANDY: I have no other questions of 
this w i t n e s s , Your Honor. 
THE C O U R T : Further direct, Mr. Heward? 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
R E - D I R E C T EXAMINATION ( C O N T I N U E D ) 
3Y MR. HEWARD: 
Q T r o o p e r S m i t h , on cross Mr. Handy asked you 
if you had ever seen the Defendant before and you indicated 
that you had seen him at his place of employment. Did I he 
you right that you said you had seen him another time, or i 
tnat the only time that you had seen him? 
A I believe that's the only time I had seen 
him. 
Q Okay. I just heard you w r o n g . 
MR. HANDY: Just one q u e s t i o n . How was Mr. 
Wells dressed on that occasion? We haven't talked about 
that. 
THE W I T N E S S : W e l l , I think he had kind of 
blue shirt like that yellow work shirt type, and I can't 
remember about the pants. They could have been either some 
type of work p a n t s , I assume. 
MR. HANDY: Could have been coveralls like 
mechanics wear? 
THE WITNESS: W e l l , he didn't have the bib 
coveral1s , no. 
MR. HANDY: All right. 
THE WITNESS: Or anything -- it was summer 
time, so I believe that he just had a blue shirt on. 
MR. HANDY: All right. 
THE W I T N E S S : And I can't -- dark p a n t s , 
darker than the shirt that he's got on. 
MR. HANDY: A work shirt of this type --
THE WITNESS: Y e s . 
MR. HANDY: -- that he is wearing now. Okay 
I have no further q u e s t i o n s . 
MR. HEWARD: Permission to approach, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Heward) T r o o p e r Smith, do you know 
what alcohol smells like? 
A Y e s . 
Q Have you had occasion to smell this prior 
to today? 
A I don't remember whether I smelled it or 
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not. 
Q Okay. I hand you what has been marked as 
State's Proposed No. 1 and ask you to smell that. Does that 
have an odor? 
A Definitely. 
Q And is that odor something that you 
recognize? 
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3Y MR. HEUARi): 
Q 
o c c u p a t i on? 
A 
Yes. 
What would that be? 
The odor of alcohol . 
MR. HEWARD: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Handy? 
MR. HANDY: I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you, you may step down. 
MR. HEWARD: We call Jim Chip, Your Honor. 
JAMES CHIP, 
was called as a witness for 
and on behalf of the Plaintiff 
and testified upon his oath as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Could you please give us your full name and 
James A. Chip, supervisor, Weber County 
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